

International Political Economy

Writing Intensive Class, Fall 2019

Syllabus

Section 25306, POLS 412-901, TTh, 10:20 a.m. - 11:35 a.m., in Allen 1016

Section 25307, POLS 412-902, TTh, 11:55 a.m. - 1:10 p.m., in Allen 1016

Instructor: Amy Pond, Assistant Professor

Department of Political Science

Email: apond@tamu.edu

Phone: (979) 845-2845

Office: Allen 2123

Office Hours:

TTh 1:30 - 2:30 p.m.,

or by appointment

Course description in TAMU Undergraduate Catalog: Politics of international economic relations; interactions between political and economic realms in the contemporary world.

Course overview:

International Political Economy (IPE) is an interdisciplinary field focused on the relationship between international economic relations and political incentives. Economic issues include trade and financial flows, monetary policy, fiscal policy, growth, and economic crisis. Political incentives often stem from regime type, partisanship, political institutions, and election timing. After completing this course, students will be able to answer the following questions.

- How do domestic political institutions and partisanship influence international economic policy and economic outcomes?
- How do international economic flows affect and constrain domestic policymakers?

This course is defined as a “W” course, which means that the course is writing intensive. We will devote a substantial amount of time to the practice of understanding existing written work and improving our own writing skills. For more details about “W” courses, go to: <https://writingcenter.tamu.edu/Students/W-C-Courses>. Regardless of how well a paper you write addresses the substantive material for the assignment, it will not earn a passing grade unless your writing in the paper is also graded to be at a passing level. Becoming an effective writer requires repetition; we will write many short papers in this class.

Prerequisites: POLS 206; junior or senior classification or approval of department head.

Learning outcomes: Upon successfully completing the course, students will be able to:

- apply basic knowledge of historical events in international political economy,
- understand and extend existing theories presented in academic work,
- develop a logical argument or account of a historical event,
- draw on evidence to evaluate the theory, and
- clearly and concisely present ideas, in writing and orally, to their peers.

Learning environment: Every student must feel comfortable speaking in this class. For this reason, we will maintain open minds and always be respectful of one another. Students with concerns or requests of any sort should let me know as soon as possible.

Americans with Disabilities Act Policy Statement: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact Disability Services, currently located in the Disability Services building at the Student Services at White Creek complex on west campus or call 979-845-1637. For additional information visit <http://disability.tamu.edu>.

Title IX and Statement on Limits to Confidentiality: Texas A&M University and the College of Liberal Arts are committed to fostering a learning environment that is safe and

productive for all. University policies and federal and state laws provide guidance for achieving such an environment. Although class materials are generally considered confidential pursuant to student record policies and laws, University employees — including instructors — cannot maintain confidentiality when it conflicts with their responsibility to report certain issues that jeopardize the health and safety of our community. As the instructor, I must report (per Texas A&M System Regulation 08.01.01) the following information to other University offices if you share it with me, even if you do not want the disclosed information to be shared: Allegations of sexual assault, sexual discrimination, or sexual harassment when they involve TAMU students, faculty, or staff, or third parties visiting campus.

These reports may trigger contact from a campus official who will want to talk with you about the incident that you have shared. In many cases, it will be your decision whether or not you wish to speak with that individual. If you would like to talk about these events in a more confidential setting, you are encouraged to make an appointment with the Student Counseling Service (<https://scs.tamu.edu/>).

Students and faculty can report non-emergency behavior that causes them to be concerned at <http://tellsomebody.tamu.edu>.

Course materials: There is one required textbook for the course. It is available at area bookstores. Edition 4, 5, or 6 is acceptable for use in the course, and the syllabus lists the assigned reading in all editions.

Oatley, Thomas. *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*. New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc.

There are two recommended books for the course. McCloskey provides a clear, concise summary of the fundamentals of writing in the social sciences. Frieden, Lake and Broz present a compilation of influential articles and ideas in IPE; many of the chapters are available in article form.

McCloskey, Deirdre. 2000. *Economical Writing*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc.

Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz. 2010. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. New York, N.Y.: Norton, 5th edn.

A number of additional readings are also required; students can access them on the library e-reserves: <https://library-reserves.library.tamu.edu/areslocal/index.htm>. Students may need to download a .pdf viewer before viewing them. If, for some reason, the articles are not available on the course site, students should inform me and locate the article. The University Library and Google Scholar are good resources for this. Students are expected to have completed the reading by the day for which it has been assigned.

Assignments and Grading: Grades in the course will be based on the following assignments:

- 10 percent – in-class writing assignments
- 15 percent – 3 in-class presentations (5 percent each)
- 20 percent – 2 in-class exams (10 percent each)
- 30 percent – 2 mini papers (15 percent each)
- 25 percent – final paper

Grades will be awarded based on the following grading scale: A=90-100, B=80-89, C=70-79, D=60-69, F=59 and below.

In-class Writing Assignments: I will regularly give students a writing prompt in class. Some of the responses to these prompts will be collected and graded. Students should always come to class prepared to write, with paper and a pen or pencil. The assignments are meant to provide a low-pressure way for students to practice writing regularly.

A student whose absence is excused will not be penalized for that absence and should make

arrangements to complete any missed assignments as soon as possible with me. Make-up work must be completed in a timeframe not to exceed 30 calendar days from the last day of the initial absence. The student is responsible for notifying me of the absence and providing satisfactory evidence to substantiate the reason for the absence. Accommodations for absences can be sought either prior to or after the absence, but not later than two working days after the first day of the absence. See Student Rule 7 for details <http://student-rules.tamu.edu/rule07>.

Cell phones are not permitted in class. Computers are permitted for word processing, but, if they become too distracting, students may be asked to put them away.

Presentations: Each student will present three times. The first two presentations will include a summary of and response to an academic article from the syllabus. The final presentation will be a summary of the student's final paper. Each presentation will be worth 5 percent of the student's course grade. Presentations will be assigned to students at the beginning of the second class meeting. Presentations are expected to last around 10 minutes and should not exceed 12 minutes.

The article summary should include the research question, theory, research design, findings, and conclusion. The response should include an assessment of the author's argument, the soundness of the methodology (accurate measurement, research design, etc), and two possible extensions.

Mini Papers: All students will complete two, distinct mini papers. The papers should focus on the material covered in the class; the first paper should emphasize Trade or Investment, and the second paper should focus on Investment or Monetary Policy. The papers will be 750-1,000 words (3-4 pages) in length, excluding citations. They must be double-spaced with 12 point-Times New Roman font and one-inch margins. Citations will follow the Author-Date system, described in the Chicago Manual of Style. All papers should include a title page with the student's name, article title, and word count. To ensure the use of high-quality citations, students should verify that the publications they cite are peer-reviewed or that the author is a researcher at a University or non-partisan institute.¹

The purpose of these papers is to give students practice constructing theories and identifying evidence and to provide comments on students' writing and content. These are not outlines and should not contain bullet points; they are short writing assignments, requiring concise presentation of information. Students will workshop these papers with their peers, and the professor will provide comments on each of these papers. There are two forms that a successful paper may take.

1. Evidence First Students may generalize from a specific event. They select a historical event of interest to them. To ensure that sufficient evidence is available, the event must have occurred at least 10 years ago. The student will research the event, drawing on a minimum of five academic citations, and chronicle what happened, including who the relevant actors were, what they hoped to achieve, and what actions they took. From this event, the student will begin to develop a generalizable theory of when similar events should occur.

2. Theory First Students may instead choose to start by writing a general theory and research design. This approach is similar to the structure of the articles we read in class. Students will lay out a clear question and explain why the question is important, referencing at least five academic sources related to the question. Students will present a theory that answers the question and derive a testable hypothesis from the theory. Finally, they will present a research design that describes how evidence could be used to evaluate the theory.

Final Paper: At the end of the semester, students will complete a final paper that includes both theory and evidence. Students may revise and extend one of the mini papers that they wrote during the semester (recommended) or begin a new paper. The papers will be 1,250-1,500 words (5-6 pages) in length, excluding citations. They will be double-spaced with 12 point-Times New Roman font and one-inch margins. Citations will again follow the Author-Date system,

¹I am always happy to help students assess the quality of specific sources.

described in the Chicago Manual of Style. All papers should include a title page with the student's name, article title, and word count. The final paper will be due online during the final exam period. There are again two possible approaches.

1. Evidence First If taking the evidence first approach, the paper should include all the information discussed above, but the theory must be more developed. Students should provide detailed scope conditions of when they expect the theory to apply. The theory should be connected to and distinguished from other theories that have been used to explain similar events or even the same event, drawing on an additional five academic sources (for a total of at least ten sources in the final paper). Students should also include a detailed conclusion that discusses limitations and possible extensions of the evidence and theory, as well as how these could be addressed in future research.

2. Theory First If taking the theory first approach, students must follow their research design, including any adaptations they prefer to make. While the mini paper required a question, theory, and research design, the final paper will require that students complete the research design and write a conclusion. The discussion should be deepened in each of the earlier sections with a total of ten academic citations now included. The paper must now include the presentation of evidence that is relevant to the theory (evidence may include carefully selected case studies, statistical analysis, process tracing, etc); a discussion of whether the evidence that is presented is consistent with the theory or not; and a conclusion that identifies what can be learned from the theory and evidence, as well as ideas to improve our understanding of the question in the future.

There are no "right" answers in this paper. Students should feel free to draw any conclusions they like, so long as the paper is well reasoned and demonstrates knowledge of the material.

Exams: The exams will be closed book exams featuring multiple choice and short answer questions. These exams will require students to know the assigned readings and concepts. The exams are not cumulative and will cover only readings and lectures from the preceding unit.

Grading Policy: Late assignments will lose one-third of a letter grade (i.e., from A to A-) for each day they are late. The only exceptions will be for an excused absence, in which case students must make personal arrangements with me. I will try to provide detailed comments while grading that will be helpful to students. I am also available during office hours to answer any questions students may have.

If a student feels that a grade should be changed, after discussing the grade with me, he or she should initiate a grade appeal within one week after receiving the graded assignment (late appeals will not be considered). The appeal must include the original assignment and a brief explanation detailing why the assignment deserves a higher grade. I will re-evaluate the grade.

Aggie Honor Code

"An Aggie does not lie, cheat, or steal or tolerate those who do."

Upon accepting admission to Texas A&M University, a student immediately assumes a commitment to uphold the Honor Code, to accept responsibility for learning, and to follow the philosophy and rules of the Honor System. Ignorance of the rules does not exclude any member of the TAMU community from the requirements or the processes of the Honor System. For additional information please visit: <http://aggiehonor.tamu.edu/>.

Helpful Links

- Academic Calendar <http://registrar.tamu.edu/General/Calendar.aspx>
- Final Exam Schedule
<http://registrar.tamu.edu/Courses,-Registration,-Scheduling/Final-Examination-Schedules>
- Online Catalog <http://catalog.tamu.edu/>
- Student Rules <http://student-rules.tamu.edu/>
- Religious Observances <http://dof.tamu.edu/rules/religious-observance>

Course Outline Class meets TTh for seventy five minutes each day. The readings are subject to change. Any changes will be announced in class and will be updated on the online syllabus on e-campus.

8/27 – Introduction

- Oatley Edition 6, 1-21; Edition 5, 1-20; Edition 4, 1-20.
- What is IPE? Preferences, Institutions, Policies, and Outcomes
- Core components of academic papers: question, literature, theory, research design, and evidence

8/31 – Class cancelled for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

- Find one paper – of interest to you! – that was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society and read it. Identify the components above.
- <https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/conference-2018-program>

Trade Policy

9/3 – Why trade? Principle of comparative advantage

- Oatley Edition 6, 46-59, 115-160; Edition 5, 45-58, 111-157; Edition 4, 45-59, 113-162.
- Altomonte, Carlo, Laura Bonacorsi, and Italo Colantone. 2018. Trade and Growth in the Age of Global Value Chains. *Bocconi Working Paper Series* 97:1–70.
- *Recommended* Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer. 1999. Does Trade Cause Growth? *The American Economic Review* 89 (3):379–399.

SIGN UP FOR PRESENTATIONS.

9/5 – Why do policymakers restrict trade? The factor and Stolper-Samuelson models

- Oatley Edition 6, 70-82; Edition 5, 69-79; Edition 4, 71-80.
- Milner, Helen V., and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy? *International Studies Quarterly* 48:95–119.
- Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59:157–193.

9/10 – The factor (trade) model applied to finance and other thoughts on finance
MOVE
POLITICAL RISK UP NEXT TIME

- Aitken, Brian, Ann Harrison, and Robert E. Lipsey. 1996. Wages and foreign ownership: A comparative study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States. *Journal of International Economics* 40:345–371.
- Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska. 2004. Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. *The American Economic Review* 94 (3):605–627.
- Pond, Amy. 2018. Worker Influence on Capital Account Policy: Inflow Liberalization and Outflow Restrictions. *International Interactions* 44 (2):244–267.

9/12 – The factor trade model applied to migration and other thoughts on migration

- Milanovic, Branko. 2011. Global Inequality: From Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 5820:1–25.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2014. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policy Making in the US. *International Organization* 68 (Fall):811–844.
- Sellars, Emily. 2018. Emigration and Collective Action. *Journal of Politics* Forthcoming:1–39.

9/17 – Why do policymakers restrict trade? Sector model and firm-driven explanations

- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *American Political Science Review* 96 (3):1–16.

- Kim, In Song. 2017. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 111 (1):1–20.
- Anelli, Massimo, Italo Colantone, and Piero Stanig. 2019. We Were The Robots: Automation and Voting Behavior in Western Europe. *Working Paper* 1–48.

9/19 – Why do policymakers restrict trade? Consumer and individual interests

- Oatley Edition 6, 82-92; Edition 5, 79-88; Edition 4, 80-92
- Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100 (3):369–384.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63:425–457.
- Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019. The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy. *Journal of Politics* 81 (2):585–600.

MINI-PAPER I OUTLINE/DRAFT DUE

9/24 – Trade and currency valuation

- Manger, Mark S., and Thomas Sattler. 2019. The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the post-Bretton Woods Era. *Comparative Political Studies* Forthcoming.
- Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian. 2011. Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (1):106–118.
- Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 69:913–947.

9/26 – Cooperation on international trade: trade agreements and GATT/WTO

- Oatley Edition 6, 22-45; Edition 5, 21-44; Edition 4, 21-44.
- Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 137–174.
- Limão, Nuno. 2006. Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the U.S. *American Economic Review* 96 (3):896–914.
- Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others? *International Organization* 65:639–672.

MINI-PAPER I DUE

10/1 – Participation in GATT/WTO

- Oatley Edition 6, 59-69, 349-358; Edition 5, 58-68, 358-369; Edition 4, 59-70, 372-380.
- Gowa, Joanne, and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade. *World Politics* 57:453–478.
- Betz, Timm. 2017. Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade. *Journal of Politics* 79 (4).
- Davis, Christina L., and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3):1033–1049.

10/3 – *EXAM I*

International investment

10/8 – Foreign direct investment, race to the bottom, and tax competition

- Oatley Edition 6, 161-182, 204-205; Edition 5, 158-179, 199-200; Edition 4, 164-188, 210-211.
- Rudra, Nita, and Stephan Haggard. 2005. Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World. *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (9):1015–1049.
- Mosley, Layna, and Saika Uno. 2007. Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (8):923–948.
- Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2017. The unintended consequences of bilateralism: treaty

- shopping and international tax policy. *International Organization* Forthcoming:1–32.
- *Recommended* Oatley Edition 5, 346-358; Edition 4, 365-371.
- *Recommended* Basinger, Scott J., and Mark Hallerberg. 2004. Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom. *American Political Science Review* 98 (2):261–276.

10/10 – Political Risk

- Oatley Edition 5, 183-198; Edition 5, 180-194; Edition 4, 189-204.
- Fan, Joseph P.H., Randall Morck, Lixin Colin Xu, and Bernard Yeung. 2007. Does ‘Good Government’ Draw Foreign Capital? Explaining China’s Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4206:1–40.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment. *The Journal of Politics* 70 (4):1040–1052.
- Johns, Leslie, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment. *American Political Science Review* 110 (1):31–51.

10/15 – Attracting investment: international investment agreements

- Oatley Edition 6, 198-206; Edition 5, 194-201; Edition 4, 205-213.
- Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2010. Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:1–26.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000. *International Organization* 60 (4):811–846.
- Kerner, Andrew. 2009. Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties. *International Studies Quarterly* 53:73–100.

10/17 – Contract risk

- Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16 (2):334–364.
- Antras, Pol, Mihir A. Desai, and C. Fritz Foley. 2009. Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (3):1171–1219.
- Kerner, Andrew, and Jeffrey Kucik. 2010. The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:657–682.
- Yin, Weiwen. 2019. Working Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaties and Transnational Commercial Arbitration.

10/22 – Foreign aid and remittances

- Oatley Edition 6, 304-309; Edition 5, 298-303; Edition 4, 306-315.
- Easterly, William. 2003. Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (3):23–48.
- Singer, David A. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review* 104 (2):307–323.
- Blodgett Bermeo, Sarah. 2017. Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World. *International Organization* 71:735–766.

Monetary policy

10/24 – Currency valuation and central bank independence

- Oatley Edition 6, 207-213, 263-303; Edition 5, 202-208; 255-297; Edition 4, 214-220; 266-305.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2002. Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration. *International Organization* 56 (4):831–860.
- Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. 2015. Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions. *International*

Organization 69 (1):35–61.

10/29 – The Mundell-Fleming Model or “Unholy Trinity”

– Oatley Edition 6, 255-263; Edition 5, 249-257; Oatley Edition 4, 260-266.

– Rose, Andrew. 2006. “Currency Unions.”

– Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4):1003–1027.

10/31 – Evolution of the global monetary regime

– Oatley Edition 6, 213-254; Edition 5, 208-248; Edition 4, 220-259.

– Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53 (1):71–97.

– Clark, William Roberts, and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2):323–346.

– Morrison, James Ashley. 2016. Shocking Intellectual Austerity: The Role of Ideas in the Demise of the Gold Standard in Britain. *International Organization* 70 (1):175–207.

MINI-PAPER II OUTLINE/DRAFT DUE

11/5 – The politics of banking regulation

– Rosenbluth, Frances, and Ross Schaap. 2003. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. *International Organization* 57 (2):307–336.

– Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2013. The domestic politics of financial internationalization in the developing world. *Review of International Political Economy* 20 (4):848–880.

– Wilf, Meredith. 2016. Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence from US Bank Stock Returns. *International Organization* 70 (4):763–796.

11/7 – Economic crisis

– Oatley Edition 6, 304-348; Edition 5, 298-345; Edition 4, 306-355.

– Gurtner, Francois J. 2004. “Why Did Argentina’s Currency Board Collapse?” *World Economy*: 679-697.

– Calomiris, Charles W., and Stephen H. Haber. 2014. *Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crisis and Scarce Credit*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. READ CHAPTERS 8-9.

– Lipsy, Phillip Y. 2018. Democracy and Financial Crisis. *International Organization* Forthcoming:1–32.

MINI-PAPER II DUE

11/12 – The International Monetary Fund

– Vreeland, James R. 2003. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases. *International Political Science Review* 24 (3):321–343.

– Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):577–591.

– Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:49–77.

11/14 – *EXAM II*

11/19, 11/21, and 11/26 – *PAPER PRESENTATIONS*

12/3 – *PAPER WORKSHOP*

12/6 – *Final papers due during the exam period*

– 12:30 - 2:30 p.m. for TTh 10:20 a.m. - 11:35 a.m.

– 3:00 - 5:00 p.m. for TTh 11:55 a.m. - 1:10 p.m.

References

- Aitken, Brian, Ann Harrison, and Robert E. Lipsey. 1996. Wages and foreign ownership: A comparative study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States. *Journal of International Economics* 40:345–371.
- Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2010. Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:1–26.
- Altomonte, Carlo, Laura Bonacorsi, and Italo Colantone. 2018. Trade and Growth in the Age of Global Value Chains. *Bocconi Working Paper Series* 97:1–70.
- Anelli, Massimo, Italo Colantone, and Piero Stanig. 2019. We Were The Robots: Automation and Voting Behavior in Western Europe. *Working Paper* 1–48.
- Antras, Pol, Mihir A. Desai, and C. Fritz Foley. 2009. Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (3):1171–1219.
- Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2017. The unintended consequences of bilateralism: treaty shopping and international tax policy. *International Organization* Forthcoming:1–32.
- Basinger, Scott J., and Mark Hallerberg. 2004. Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom. *American Political Science Review* 98 (2):261–276.
- Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53 (1):71–97.
- Betz, Timm. 2017. Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade. *Journal of Politics* 79 (4).
- Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019. The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy. *Journal of Politics* 81 (2):585–600.
- Blodgett Bermeo, Sarah. 2017. Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World. *International Organization* 71:735–766.
- Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. 2015. Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions. *International Organization* 69 (1):35–61.
- Calomiris, Charles W., and Stephen H. Haber. 2014. *Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crisis and Scarce Credit*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 137–174.
- Clark, William Roberts, and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2):323–346.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:49–77.
- Davis, Christina L., and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3):1033–1049.
- Easterly, William. 2003. Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (3):23–48.

- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000. *International Organization* 60 (4):811–846.
- Fan, Joseph P.H., Randall Morck, Lixin Colin Xu, and Bernard Yeung. 2007. Does ‘Good Government’ Draw Foreign Capital? Explaining China’s Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4206:1–40.
- Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer. 1999. Does Trade Cause Growth? *The American Economic Review* 89 (3):379–399.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2002. Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration. *International Organization* 56 (4):831–860.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A., David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz. 2010. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. New York, N.Y.: Norton, 5th edn.
- Gowa, Joanne, and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade. *World Politics* 57:453–478.
- Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16 (2):334–364.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *American Political Science Review* 96 (3):1–16.
- Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska. 2004. Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. *The American Economic Review* 94 (3):605–627.
- Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 69:913–947.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment. *The Journal of Politics* 70 (4):1040–1052.
- Johns, Leslie, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment. *American Political Science Review* 110 (1):31–51.
- Kerner, Andrew. 2009. Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties. *International Studies Quarterly* 53:73–100.
- Kerner, Andrew, and Jeffrey Kucik. 2010. The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:657–682.
- Kim, In Song. 2017. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 111 (1):1–20.
- Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100 (3):369–384.
- Lipsy, Phillip Y. 2018. Democracy and Financial Crisis. *International Organization* Forthcoming:1–32.
- Manger, Mark S., and Thomas Sattler. 2019. The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the post-Bretton Woods Era. *Comparative Political Studies* Forthcoming.

- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63:425–457.
- McCloskey, Deirdre. 2000. *Economical Writing*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc.
- Milanovic, Branko. 2011. Global Inequality: From Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 5820:1–25.
- Milner, Helen V., and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy? *International Studies Quarterly* 48:95–119.
- Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59:157–193.
- Morrison, James Ashley. 2016. Shocking Intellectual Austerity: The Role of Ideas in the Demise of the Gold Standard in Britain. *International Organization* 70 (1):175–207.
- Mosley, Layna, and Saika Uno. 2007. Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (8):923–948.
- Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4):1003–1027.
- Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others? *International Organization* 65:639–672.
- Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2013. The domestic politics of financial internationalization in the developing world. *Review of International Political Economy* 20 (4):848–880.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2014. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policy Making in the US. *International Organization* 68 (Fall):811–844.
- Pond, Amy. 2018. Worker Influence on Capital Account Policy: Inflow Liberalization and Outflow Restrictions. *International Interactions* 44 (2):244–267.
- Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian. 2011. Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (1):106–118.
- Rosenbluth, Frances, and Ross Schaap. 2003. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. *International Organization* 57 (2):307–336.
- Rudra, Nita, and Stephan Haggard. 2005. Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World. *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (9):1015–1049.
- Sellers, Emily. 2018. Emigration and Collective Action. *Journal of Politics* Forthcoming:1–39.
- Singer, David A. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review* 104 (2):307–323.
- Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):577–591.
- Vreeland, James R. 2003. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases. *International Political Science Review* 24 (3):321–343.
- Wilf, Meredith. 2016. Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence from US Bank Stock Returns. *International Organization* 70 (4):763–796.