

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Graduate Class, Spring 2020
Syllabus

POLS 635-600, Tuesday 9:00 - 11:50 a.m., in LASB 319

Instructor: Amy Pond, Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Email: apond@tamu.edu

Office: LASB 334
Office Hours:
TTh 1:30 - 2:30 p.m.

COURSE OVERVIEW In this class, we will explore the relationship between international economic relations and political incentives. Economic issues include trade and financial flows, migration, monetary policy, and economic crisis. Political incentives often stem from regime type, partisanship, political institutions, and election timing. The focus of the course will be to develop and evaluate new theories in IPE.

LEARNING OUTCOMES Upon successfully completing the course, students will be able to clearly synthesize and present, in writing and orally, theoretical arguments from IPE. Students will also develop their own arguments or accounts of historical events. They will learn to critique and construct research designs to evaluate these arguments.

LEARNING ENVIRONMENT Every student must feel comfortable speaking in this class. For this reason, we will maintain open minds and always be respectful of one another. Students with concerns or requests of any sort should let me know as soon as possible.

DIVERSITY STATEMENT The Department of Political Science supports the Texas A&M University commitment to diversity, and welcomes individuals from any racial, ethnic, religious, age, gender, sexual orientation, class, disability, and nationality. (See <http://diversity.tamu.edu/>). In the spirit of this vital commitment, in this course each voice in the classroom has something of value to contribute to all discussions. Everyone is expected to respect the different experiences, beliefs and values expressed by fellow students and the instructor, and will engage in reasoned discussion that refrains from derogatory comments about other people, cultures, groups, or viewpoints.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT POLICY STATEMENT Texas A&M University is committed to providing equitable access to learning opportunities for all students. If you experience barriers to your education due to a disability or think you may have a disability, please contact Disability Resources in the Student Services Building or at (979) 845-1637 or visit <http://disability.tamu.edu>. Disabilities may include, but are not limited to attentional, learning, mental health, sensory, physical, or chronic health conditions. All students are encouraged to discuss their disability related needs with Disability Resources and their instructors as soon as possible.

TITLE IX AND STATEMENT ON LIMITS TO CONFIDENTIALITY Texas A&M University and the College of Liberal Arts are committed to fostering a learning environment that is safe and productive for all. University policies and federal and state laws provide guidance for achieving such an environment. Although class materials are generally considered confidential pursuant to student record policies and laws, University employees – including instructors – cannot maintain confidentiality when it conflicts with their responsibility to report certain issues that jeopardize the health and safety of our community. As the instructor, I must report (per Texas A&M System Regulation 08.01.01) the following information to other University offices if you share it with me, even if you do not want the disclosed information to be shared: Allegations of sexual assault, sexual discrimination, or sexual harassment when they involve TAMU students, faculty, or staff, or third parties visiting campus.

These reports may trigger contact from a campus official who will want to talk with you about the incident that you have shared. In many cases, it will be your decision whether or not you

wish to speak with that individual. If you would like to talk about these events in a more confidential setting, you are encouraged to make an appointment with the Student Counseling Service at <https://scs.tamu.edu>.

Students and faculty can report non-emergency behavior that causes them to be concerned at <http://tellsomebody.tamu.edu>.

COURSE MATERIALS There are no required textbooks for the course. Thomas Oatley's undergraduate textbook may be useful for background information. Deirdre McCloskey's writing guide provides useful tips for anyone working in Political Science or Economics.

Oatley, Thomas. *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*. New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc. Edition 4, 5, or 6.

McCloskey, Deirdre. 2000. *Economical Writing*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc.

The class draws mostly on articles. I will do my best to circulate the readings prior to class; students may also access the readings using Google Scholar and the University Library. Students are expected to have completed the reading by the day for which it has been assigned.

ASSIGNMENTS AND GRADING Grades in the course will be based on the following assignments:

1. 30 percent – 3 short papers (10 percent each)
2. 15 percent – 3 article presentations (5 percent each)
3. 35 percent – final paper
4. 10 percent – presentation of final paper
5. 10 percent – review of two students' paper drafts (5 percent each)

Grades will be awarded based on the following grading scale: A=90-100, B=80-89, C=70-79, D=60-69, F=59 and below.

ATTENDANCE Students are expected to attend class and to come prepared to discuss the readings – *the reading must be completed prior to class on the day it is listed on the syllabus*. If a student must miss more than one class, he or she should notify me as soon as possible. After the first absence, students will be responsible for writing a summary of that week's readings. If the summary is not complete by May 5th, three percentage points will be subtracted from the student's grade.

PRESENTATIONS Each student will present four times (three article presentations, as well as the draft of his or her final paper). The first three presentations will summarize an academic article from the selections of 'RECOMMENDED' articles on the syllabus. Presentations will be assigned to students during the first class meeting. Each article presentation will be worth 5 percent of the student's grade. The final presentation will be a summary of the draft of the student's final paper. This is a great opportunity to get feedback before finalizing the paper. The final presentation will be worth 10 percent of the student's course grade.

The objective of this assignment is to teach students to give an effective conference presentation. Presentations are expected to last around 10 minutes and should not exceed 13 minutes. The article summary should include (where applicable) the research question, theory, research design, findings, and conclusion.

SHORT PAPERS All students will complete three, distinct short papers over the course of the semester. No more than one short paper may be submitted each week. The short papers should be about 500-1,000 words in length, excluding citations (double-spaced this is about 2-4 pages). The title, author, and word count should be written on the first page of the paper.

The purpose of these papers is to give students practice constructing theories and providing anecdotes that illustrate the mechanisms of interest. These are not outlines and should not contain bullet points; they are short writing assignments, requiring clear and concise prose. The assignment may take two forms.

1. *Case study/anecdote* Students interested in writing a case study should select a historical event of interest to them (for example, during a week focused on trade, a student could provide a historical account of the passage of the Corn Laws). The student will research the event and chronicle what happened, including who the relevant actors were, what they hoped to achieve, and what actions they took. From this event, the student will begin to develop a generalizable theory of when similar events should occur.

2. *Extension* Students may instead choose to start by extending one of the theories that we discuss in class or coming up with a novel theory that relates to one week's topic. Students will lay out a clear question and briefly explain why the question is important. Students will present a theory that answers the question and derive a testable hypothesis from the theory.

FINAL PAPER At the end of the semester, students will complete a final paper that includes a question, theory, and research design. Students may revise and extend one or even two of the short papers that they wrote during the semester or begin a new paper. The papers should be around 2,000-3,000 words (8-12 pages) in length, excluding citations. They will be double-spaced with 12 point-Times New Roman font and one-inch margins. Citations should follow the Author-Date system, described in the Chicago Manual of Style. All papers should include a title page with the student's name, article title, and word count. The final paper will be due to apond@tamu.edu on May 5 by 5 p.m.

GRADING POLICY: Late assignments will lose one-third of a letter grade (i.e., from A to A-) for each day they are late. The only exceptions will be for an excused absence, in which case students must make personal arrangements with me. I will try to provide detailed comments while grading that will be helpful to students. I am also available during office hours to answer any questions students may have.

If a student feels that a grade should be changed, after discussing the grade with me, he or she should initiate a grade appeal within one week after receiving the graded assignment (late appeals will not be considered). The appeal must include the original assignment and a brief explanation detailing why the assignment deserves a higher grade. I will re-evaluate the grade.

AGGIE HONOR CODE

“An Aggie does not lie, cheat, or steal or tolerate those who do.”

Upon accepting admission to Texas A&M University, a student immediately assumes a commitment to uphold the Honor Code, to accept responsibility for learning, and to follow the philosophy and rules of the Honor System. Ignorance of the rules does not exclude any member of the TAMU community from the requirements or the processes of the Honor System. For additional information please visit: <http://aggiehonor.tamu.edu/>.

HELPFUL LINKS

1. Academic Calendar <http://registrar.tamu.edu/General/Calendar.aspx>
2. Final Exam Schedule
<http://registrar.tamu.edu/Courses,-Registration,-Scheduling/Final-Examination-Schedules>
3. Online Catalog <http://catalog.tamu.edu/>
4. Student Rules <http://student-rules.tamu.edu/>
5. Religious Observances <http://dof.tamu.edu/rules/religious-observance>

COURSE OUTLINE Class meets Tuesday for two hours and fifty minutes. The readings are subject to change. Any changes will be announced in class and will be updated on the online syllabus.

January 14 – Introduction – What is IPE?

1. I will present: Altomonte, Carlo, Laura Bonacorsi, and Italo Colantone. 2018. Trade and Growth in the Age of Global Value Chains. *Bocconi Working Paper Series* 97:1–70.
2. RECOMMENDED Lake, David A. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *Review of International Organization* 4:219–244.

3. RECOMMENDED Seabrooke, Leonard, and Kevin L. Young. 2017. The networks and niches of international political economy. *Review of International Political Economy* 24 (2):288–331.
4. Find one paper– of interest to you!– that was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society and read it. Identify the components of a paper. <https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/conference-2018-program>

January 21 – Economic Effects of Trade

1. Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81 (4):1121–1137.
2. Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *American Political Science Review* 96 (3):1–16.
3. Kim, In Song, and Iain Osgood. 2019. Firms in Trade and Trade Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 22:399–417.
4. Autor, David H., David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2016. Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure. *NBER Working Paper* 22637:1–63.
5. Mansfield, Edward D., Diana C. Mutz, and Devon Brackbill. 2019. Effects of the Great Recession on American Attitudes Toward Trade. *British Journal of Political Science* 49 (1):37–58.
6. RECOMMENDED Baker, Andy. 2005. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4):924–938.
7. RECOMMENDED Rho, Sungmin, and Michael Tomz. 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization* 71 (S1):S85–S108.
8. RECOMMENDED Jamal, Amaney, and Helen V. Milner. 2019. Economic Self-Interest, Information, and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from an Experiment in Tunisia. *Review of International Political Economy* 26 (4):545–572.
9. RECOMMENDED Anelli, Massimo, Italo Colantone, and Piero Stanig. 2019. We Were The Robots: Automation and Voting Behavior in Western Europe. *Working Paper* 1–48.

January 28 – Trade and Domestic Politics

1. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization* 36 (2):379–415.
2. Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59:157–193.
3. Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100 (3):369–384.
4. Rickard, Stephanie J. 2012. Electoral Systems, Voters' Interests and Geographic Dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (4):855–877.
5. Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Gulotty. 2014. America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform. *International Organization* 68:263–295.
6. RECOMMENDED Margalit, Yotam. 2011. Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections. *American Political Science Review* 105 (1):166–188.
7. RECOMMENDED Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019. The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy. *Journal of Politics* 81 (2):585–600.
8. RECOMMENDED Manger, Mark S., and Thomas Sattler. 2019. The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the post-Bretton Woods Era. *Comparative Political Studies* Forthcoming.

February 4 – Trade and International Organizations

1. Limão, Nuno. 2006. Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the U.S. *American Economic Review* 96 (3):896–914.
2. Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61:37–67.
3. Davis, Christina L., and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3):1033–1049.
4. Betz, Timm. 2017. Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade. *Journal of Politics* 79 (4).
5. Davis, Christina L., and Meredith Wilf. 2017. Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO. *Journal of Politics* 79 (3):964–978.
6. RECOMMENDED Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 57:137–174.
7. RECOMMENDED Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others? *International Organization* 65:639–672.
8. RECOMMENDED Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 69:913–947.
9. RECOMMENDED Young, Alasdair R. 2016. Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. *Review of International Political Economy* 23 (3):345–378.

February 11 – Economic Sanctions & Security

1. Kaempfer, William H., and Anton D. Lowenberg. 2007. Chapter 27. The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions. *Handbook of Defense Economics* 2:867–911.
2. Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2011. Does trade prevent or promote interstate conflict initiation? *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (4):437–453.
3. Poast, Paul. 2012. Does issue linkage work? *International Organization* 66 (2):277–310.
4. Peksen, Dursun, Timothy M. Peterson, and A. Cooper Drury. 2014. Media-driven Humanitarianism? News Media Coverage of Human Rights Abuses and the Use of Economic Sanctions. *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (4):1–12.
5. Amodio, Francesco, Leonardo Baccini, and Michele Di Maio. 2020. Security, Trade, and Political Violence. *Journal of the European Economic Association* Forthcoming.
6. RECOMMENDED Gowa, Joanne. 1994. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1.
7. RECOMMENDED Smith, Alastair. 1996. The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions. *International Interactions* 21 (3):229–245.
8. RECOMMENDED Pond, Amy. 2017. Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (5):1073–1094.

February 18 – Immigration and Remittances

1. Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe. *International Organization* 61:399–442.
2. Milanovic, Branko. 2011. Global Inequality: From Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 5820:1–25.
3. Peters, Margaret E. 2014. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policy Making in the US. *International Organization* 68 (Fall):811–844.
4. Mosley, Layna, and David A. Singer. 2015. Migration, Labor, and the International Political Economy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 18:283–301.
5. Sellars, Emily. 2018. Emigration and Collective Action. *Journal of Politics* Forthcoming:1–39.

6. RECOMMENDED Hanson, Gordon H., Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies. *Economics & Politics* 19 (1):1–33.
7. RECOMMENDED Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. *American Economic Review* 101 (7):3221–3252.
8. RECOMMENDED Ahmed, Faizal. 2012. The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival. *American Political Science Review* 106 (1):146–165.
9. RECOMMENDED Bearce, David, and Andrew F. Hart. 2017. International Labor Mobility and the Variety of Democratic Political Institutions. *International Organization* 71 (1):65–95.

February 25 – Capital Account Openness

1. Goodman, John B., and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. *World Politics* 46 (1):50–82.
2. Quinn, Dennis P., and Carla Inclán. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3):771–813.
3. Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1):171–189.
4. Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2013. The domestic politics of financial internationalization in the developing world. *Review of International Political Economy* 20 (4):848–880.
5. Pond, Amy. 2018b. Worker Influence on Capital Account Policy: Inflow Liberalization and Outflow Restrictions. *International Interactions* 44 (2):244–267.
6. RECOMMENDED Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization* 45 (4):425–451.
7. RECOMMENDED Brooks, Sarah M. 2004. Explaining Capital Account Liberalization in Latin America: A Transitional Cost Approach. *World Politics* 56 (3):389–430.
8. RECOMMENDED Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. 2006. What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions. *Journal of Development Economics* 81:163–192.
9. RECOMMENDED Mukherjee, Bumba, Vineeta Yadav, and Sergio Béjar. 2014. Electoral Particularism, Bank Concentration, and Capital Account Liberalization in Developing Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (6):851–877.

March 3 – International Constraints

1. Rudra, Nita, and Stephan Haggard. 2005. Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World. *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (9):1015–1049.
2. Li, Quan. 2006. Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis. *The Journal of Politics* 68 (1):62–74.
3. Mosley, Layna, and Saika Uno. 2007. Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (8):923–948.
4. Kerner, Andrew. 2015. Can Foreign Stock Investors Influence Policymaking? *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (1):35–64.
5. Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2017. The unintended consequences of bilateralism: treaty shopping and international tax policy. *International Organization* Forthcoming:1–32.
6. RECOMMENDED Mosley, Layna. 2000. Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. *International Organization* 54 (4):737–774.
7. RECOMMENDED Franzese, Robert J., and Jude C. Hays. 2008. Interdependence in Comparative Politics: Substance, Theory, Empirics, Substance. *Comparative Political*

Studies 41 (4/5):742–780.

8. RECOMMENDED Rethel, Lena. 2011. Whose legitimacy? Islamic finance and the global financial order. *Review of International Political Economy* 18 (1):75–98.
9. RECOMMENDED Pond, Amy. 2018. Financial Liberalization: Stable Autocracies and Constrained Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (1):105–135.

March 17 – Political Risk

1. Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries. *International Organization* 57 (1):175–211.
2. Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment. *The Journal of Politics* 70 (4):1040–1052.
3. Antras, Pol, Mihir A. Desai, and C. Fritz Foley. 2009. Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (3):1171–1219.
4. Johns, Leslie, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment. *American Political Science Review* 110 (1):31–51.
5. Beazer, Quintin H., and Daniel J. Blake. 2018. The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment. *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (2):470–485.
6. RECOMMENDED Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16 (2):334–364.
7. RECOMMENDED Gray, Julia. 2009. International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk. *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4):931–949.
8. RECOMMENDED Graham, Benjamin A.T. 2014. Diaspora-owned firms and social responsibility. *Review of International Political Economy* 21 (2):432–466.

March 24 – International Investment Agreements

1. Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization* 60 (4):811–846.
2. Kerner, Andrew. 2009. Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties. *International Studies Quarterly* 53:73–100.
3. Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2010. Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:1–26.
4. Wellhausen, Rachel L. 2016. Recent Trends in Investor–State Dispute Settlement. *Journal of International Dispute Settlement* Forthcoming:1–19.
5. Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019b. Foreign Financing and the International Sources of Property Rights. *World Politics* 71 (3):503–541.
6. RECOMMENDED Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2011. Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 65 (3):401–432.
7. RECOMMENDED Kerner, Andrew, and Jane Lawrence. 2012. What’s the Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation. *British Journal of Political Science* 1–15.
8. RECOMMENDED Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2017. What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes? *International Organization* 71:559–583.

March 31 – Exchange Rates, Central Banks, and Credibility

1. Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53 (1):71–97.

2. Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2002. Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration. *International Organization* 56 (4):831–860.
3. Guisinger, Alexandra, and David A. Singer. 2010. Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility. *International Organization* 64 (2):313–337.
4. Morrison, James Ashley. 2016. Shocking Intellectual Austerity: The Role of Ideas in the Demise of the Gold Standard in Britain. *International Organization* 70 (1):175–207.
5. Bodea, Cristina, and Masaaki Higashijima. 2017. Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending? *British Journal of Political Science* 47 (1):47–70.
6. RECOMMENDED Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 2003. The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. *The American Political Science Review* 97 (3):407–423.
7. RECOMMENDED Stein, Ernesto H., and Jorge M. Streb. 2004. Elections and the timing of devaluations. *Journal of International Economics* 63:119–145.
8. RECOMMENDED Bodea, Cristina. 2010. The political economy of fixed exchange rate regimes: The experience of post-communist countries. *European Journal of Political Economy* 26 (2):248–264.
9. RECOMMENDED Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. 2015. International Finance and Central Bank Independence: Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital. *Journal of Politics* 77 (1):268–284.

April 7 – Monetary Policy, Bank Regulation, and Mundell-Fleming

1. Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4):1003–1027.
2. Clark, William Roberts, and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2):323–346.
3. Bernhard, William, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. 2002. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. *International Organization* 56 (4):693–723.
4. Rey, H el ene. 2015. Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence. *NBER Working Paper No. 21162* 1–42.
5. Wilf, Meredith. 2016. Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence from US Bank Stock Returns. *International Organization* 70 (4):763–796.
6. RECOMMENDED Singer, David Andrew. 2004. Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization. *International Organization* 58:531–565.
7. RECOMMENDED Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. 2005. The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87 (3):423–438.
8. RECOMMENDED Kerner, Andrew, and Jeffrey Kucik. 2010. The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:657–682.

April 14 – Crisis and the International Monetary Fund

1. Vreeland, James R. 2003. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases. *International Political Science Review* 24 (3):321–343.
2. Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):577–591.
3. Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund. *International Organization* 60 (2):367–399.
4. Calomiris, Charles W., and Stephen H. Haber. 2014. *Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crisis and Scarce Credit*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Chapters 8-9.

5. Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stefanie Walter. 2016. The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis. *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (7):811–840.
6. RECOMMENDED Haggard, Stephan, and Jongryn Mo. 2000. The Political Economy of the Korean Financial Crisis. *Review of International Political Economy* 7 (2):197–218.
7. RECOMMENDED Abiad, Abdul, and Ashoka Mody. 2005. Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It? *American Economic Review* 95 (1):66–88.
8. RECOMMENDED Leblang, David, and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises. *International Organization* 60, 245–250.
9. RECOMMENDED Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:49–77.
10. RECOMMENDED Lipsky, Phillip Y. 2018. Democracy and Financial Crisis. *International Organization* Forthcoming:1–32.

April 21 – Foreign Aid & State Capacity

1. Morrison, Kevin M. 2007. Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario. *Public Choice* 131:365–386.
2. Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian. 2011. Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (1):106–118.
3. Bastiaens, Ida, and Nita Rudra. 2016. Trade liberalization and the challenges of revenue mobilization: can international financial institutions make a difference? *Review of International Political Economy* 23 (2):261–289.
4. Blodgett Bermeo, Sarah. 2017. Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World. *International Organization* 71:735–766.
5. Eichengreen, Barry, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves, and Kris James Mitchener. 2019. Public Debt through the Ages. *NBER Working Paper* 25494:1–58.
6. RECOMMENDED Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2007. Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2):251–284.
7. RECOMMENDED Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. 2009. Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (1):1–18.
8. RECOMMENDED Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox, and Sebastian Saiegh. 2012. Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage. *International Organization* 66:709–738.
9. RECOMMENDED Grittersová, Jana. 2014. Transfer of reputation: Multinational banks and perceived creditworthiness of transition countries. *Review of International Political Economy* 21 (4):878–912.
10. RECOMMENDED Betz, Timm. 2019. Tariff Evasion and Trade Policies. *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (2):380–393.

April 28 – Student presentations & circulate drafts for peer review

April 30 – Circulate comments from peer review by 5 p.m.

May 5 – Final papers due via email, apond@tamu.edu, by 5 p.m.

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