

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Graduate Class, Spring 2025
Syllabus

POLS 5015, Thursday 2:30 - 5:20 p.m., in Seigle L004

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Office Hours:
By appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION This course serves as a field seminar for the international political economy (IPE) sub-field of International Relations. We cover the theories and approaches central to understanding both foundational and cutting-edge research in IPE, with a focus on the sort of work that is being published in top journals. We will cover topics such as the politics of international trade, monetary policy, and international investment.

LEARNING OUTCOMES Upon successfully completing the course, students will be able to clearly synthesize and present, in writing and orally, theoretical arguments from IPE. Students will also develop their own theories. They will learn to critique and construct research designs to evaluate these theories.

LEARNING ENVIRONMENT Every student must feel comfortable speaking in this class. For this reason, we will maintain open minds and always be respectful of one another. Students with concerns or requests of any sort should let me know as soon as possible.

UNIVERSITY POLICIES More information about university policies and resources can be found at <https://provost.wustl.edu/syllabi-resources-and-template-language-danforth-campus/>.

COURSE MATERIALS There are no required textbooks for the course. There are two undergraduate textbooks that I recommend for background information and accessible summaries of many course topics.

1. Oatley. *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*. New York, NY: Pearson Education, Inc. Edition 4, 5, or 6.
2. Frieden, Lake, and Broz. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. New York, NY: Norton.

Deirdre McCloskey's writing guide (available here https://www.deirdremccloskey.com/docs/pdf/Article_86.pdf) provides useful tips for anyone working in Political Science or Economics.

The class draws mostly on articles. I will do my best to circulate the readings prior to class; students may also access the readings using Google Scholar and the University Library. Students are expected to have completed the reading by the day for which it has been assigned.

ASSIGNMENTS AND GRADING Grades in the course will be based on the following assignments:

1. 40 percent – 4 short papers (10 percent each)
2. 10 percent – 2 article presentations (5 percent each)
3. 10 percent – 2 article responses (5 percent each)
4. 35 percent – final paper
5. 5 percent – review of two students' paper drafts (2.5 percent each)

Grades will be awarded based on the following grading scale: A=90-100, B=80-89, C=70-79, D=60-69, F=59 and below.

ATTENDANCE Students are expected to attend class and to come prepared to discuss the readings – *the reading must be completed prior to class on the day it is listed on the syllabus*. If a student must miss more than one class, he or she should notify me as soon as possible. After the first absence, students will be responsible for writing a summary of that week's readings. If the summary is not complete by April 24th, three percentage points will be subtracted from the student's grade.

PRESENTATIONS Each student will present four times (two article presentations and two article responses). The article presentations will summarize an academic article from the selections of ‘*Rec*’ articles on the syllabus. Article responses will respond and extend an academic article from the syllabus (either a class reading or a *Rec* reading that someone else is presenting). Presentations will be assigned to students during the first class meeting. Each article presentation will be worth 5 percent of the student’s grade.

The objective of this assignment is to teach students to give an effective conference presentation. Presentations are expected to last around 10 minutes and should not exceed 13 minutes. The article summary should include (where applicable) the research question, theory, research design, findings, and conclusion. Article responses will situate the contribution of the reading in the extent literature, present any shortcomings with the article or places for jumping off, and discuss two theoretical extensions, which were not anticipated in the article.

SHORT PAPERS All students will complete four, distinct short papers over the course of the semester. No more than one short paper may be submitted each week. The short papers should be less than 500 words in length, excluding citations (double-spaced this is about 2 pages). The title, author, and word count should be written on the first page of the paper.

The purpose of these papers is to give students practice constructing theories and providing anecdotes that illustrate the mechanisms of interest. These are not outlines and should not contain bullet points; they are short writing assignments, requiring clear and concise prose. The assignment may take two forms.

1. *Case study/anecdote* Students interested in writing a case study should select a historical event of interest to them (for example, during a week focused on trade, a student could provide a historical account of the passage of the Corn Laws). The student will research the event and chronicle what happened, including who the relevant actors were, what they hoped to achieve, and what actions they took. From this event, the student will begin to develop a generalizable theory of when similar events should occur.

2. *Extension* Students may instead choose to start by extending one of the theories that we discuss in class or coming up with a novel theory that relates to one week’s topic. Students will lay out a clear question and briefly explain why the question is important. Students will present a theory that answers the question and derive a testable hypothesis from the theory.

FINAL PAPER At the end of the semester, students will complete a final paper that includes a question, theory, and research design. Students may revise and extend one or even two of the short papers that they wrote during the semester or begin a new paper. The papers should be around 1,500 to 2,000 words (6-8 pages) in length, excluding citations. They will be double-spaced with 12 point-Times New Roman font and one-inch margins. Citations should follow the Author-Date system, described in the Chicago Manual of Style. All papers should include a title page with the student’s name, article title, and word count. The final paper will be due on Canvas.

GRADING POLICY: Late assignments will lose one-third of a letter grade (i.e., from A to A-) for each day they are late. The only exceptions will be for an excused absence, in which case students must make personal arrangements with me. I will try to provide detailed comments while grading that will be helpful to students. I am also available during office hours to answer any questions students may have.

If a student feels that a grade should be changed, after discussing the grade with me, he or she should initiate a grade appeal within one week after receiving the graded assignment. The appeal must include the original assignment and a brief explanation detailing why the assignment deserves a higher grade. I will re-evaluate the grade.

COURSE OUTLINE Class meets Thursday for two hours and fifty minutes. The readings are subject to change. Any changes will be announced in class and will be updated on the online syllabus.

January 15 – Introduction – What is IPE?

1. *Rec* Lake, David A. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *Review of International Organization* 4:219–244.
2. *Rec* Seabrooke, Leonard, and Kevin L. Young. 2017. The networks and niches of international political economy. *Review of International Political Economy* 24 (2):288–331.
3. *Rec* Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2021. *The Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy*, Chapt. Liberalization. Oxford University Press.
4. Find one paper– of interest to you!– that was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society and read it. Identify the components or a paper. <https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/past-conferences/2024>

January 23 – Trade’s economic effects

1. Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Gulotty. 2014. America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform. *International Organization* 68:263–295.
2. Owen, Erica, and Noel P. Johnston. 2017. Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment. *International Organization* 71 (4):665–699.
3. Kim, In Song. 2017. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 111 (1):1–20.
4. Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019. The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy. *Journal of Politics* 81 (2):585–600.
5. Rettl, Paula. 2024. Turning Away from the State: Trade Shocks and Informal Insurance in Brazil. *International Political Economy Society Working paper*.
6. *Rec but not for presentation* Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization* 36 (2):379–415.
7. *Rec* Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81 (4):1121–1137.
8. *Rec* Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *American Political Science Review* 96 (3):1–16.
9. *Rec* Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59:157–193.
10. *Rec* Baker, Andy. 2005. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4):924–938.
11. *Rec* Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100 (3):369–384.
12. *Rec* Nunn, Nathan. 2007. Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 569–600.
13. *Rec* Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig. 2018. The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (4):936–953.
14. *Rec* Dolan, Lindsay R., and Helen V. Milner. 2023. Low-Skilled Liberalizers: Support for Free Trade in Africa. *International Organization* 77 (Fall):848–70.
15. *Rec* Balcazar, Carlos Felipe, and Kyuwon Lee. 2024. Bureaucratic Constraints on Embedded Liberalism: Evidence from the Trade Adjustment Assistance. *International Political Economy Society Working Paper*.
16. *Rec* Kim, Minju, and Robert Gulotty. 2024. Electoral Rewards and Punishments for Trade Compensation. *World Politics* 76 (2):259–293.

January 30 – Trade and identity – incorporating individual and group characteristics

1. Rickard, Stephanie J. 2012. Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (4):855–877.
2. Rho, Sungmin, and Michael Tomz. 2017. Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization* 71 (S1):S85–S108.

3. Mansfield, Edward D., Diana C. Mutz, and Devon Brackbill. 2019. Effects of the Great Recession on American Attitudes Toward Trade. *British Journal of Political Science* 49 (1):37–58.
4. Betz, Timm, David Fortunato, and Diana Z. O’Brien. 2023. Do Women Make More Protectionist Trade Policy? *American Political Science Review* 117 (4):1522–1530.
5. Brutger, Ryan, and Daniel Lobo. 2025. Fairness According to Whom? Divergent Perceptions of Fairness Among White and Black Americans and its Effect on Trade Attitudes. *American Political Science Review* Forthcoming:1–41.
6. Rec Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt. 1999. Industrial Location and Protection: The Political Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4):1028–50.
7. Rec Margalit, Yotam. 2011. Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections. *American Political Science Review* 105 (1):166–188.
8. Rec Juhn, Chinhui, Gergely Ujhelyi, and Carolina Villegas-Sanchez. 2014. Men, women, and machines: How trade impacts gender inequality. *Journal of Development Economics* 106:179–193.
9. Rec Jamal, Amaney, and Helen V. Milner. 2019. Economic Self-Interest, Information, and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from an Experiment in Tunisia. *Review of International Political Economy* 26 (4):545–572.
10. Rec Betz, Timm, David Fortunato, and Diana Z. O’Brien. 2021. Women’s Descriptive Representation and Gendered Import Tax Discrimination. *American Political Science Review* 115 (1):307–315.
11. Rec Hannah, Erin, Adrienne Roberts, and Silke Trommer. 2022. Gender in global trade: Transforming or reproducing trade orthodoxy? *Review of International Political Economy* 29 (4):1368–1393.
12. Rec Wu, Nicole. 2022. Misattributed blame? Attitudes toward globalization in the age of automation. *Political Science Research and Methods* 10:470–487.
13. Rec Guisinger, Alexandra, and Katja Kleinberg. 2023. The Unlevel Playing Field: Gender, Discrimination, and Global Attitudes toward Trade. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 19 (4):1–23.
14. Rec Jones, Daniel B., Erica Owen, and Rena Sung. 2024. Relative exposure to negative economic shocks, racial animus, and voting. *International Political Economy Society Working Paper*.

February 6 – Multilateral Coordination and the World Trade Organization

1. Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization* 61:37–67.
2. Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others? *International Organization* 65:639–672.
3. ———. 2025. Institutional Innovation in Response to Backlash: How Members Are Circumventing the WTO Impasse. *Review of International Organizations* Forthcoming.
4. Davis, Christina L., and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication. *Journal of Politics* 71 (3):1033–1049.
5. Betz, Timm. 2017. Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade. *Journal of Politics* 79 (4).
6. Rec Davis, Christina L., and Meredith Wilf. 2017. Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO. *Journal of Politics* 77 (3):964–978.
7. Rec Betz, Timm, and Andrew Kerner. 2016. Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries. *International Organization* 70 (4):797–821.
8. Rec Brutger, Ryan. 2023. Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation. *American Political Science Review* Forthcoming:1–18.

February 13 – Networks in Trade and Preferential Trading

1. Limão, Nuno. 2006. Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the U.S. *American Economic Review* 96 (3):896–914.
2. Baccini, Leonardo, Pablo M. Pinto, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence. *International Organization* 71 (2):373–395.
3. Laaker, Dillon. 2020. Preferential Rules of Origin: Deflection or Protection? *Political Economy of International Organization* Working Paper.
4. Anderer, Christina, Andreas Dür, and Lisa Lechner. 2020. Trade policy in a “GVC World”: Multinational corporations and trade liberalization. *Business and Politics* 22 (4):639–666.
5. Rec Chase, Kerry A. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 137–174.
6. Rec Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 69:913–947.
7. Rec Lechner, Lisa. 2016. The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements. *Review of International Political Economy* 23 (5):840–871.
8. Rec Betz, Timm, and Leonhard Hummel. 2024. Domestic Production Networks and U.S. Anti-Dumping Petitions. *International Political Economy Society* Working Paper.
9. Rec Elsig, Manfred, Jesslene Lee, Soo Yeon Kim, and Andrew Lugg. 2024. Connecting regimes: Preferential Trade Agreements and the management of the intellectual property rights regime. *International Political Economy Society* Working Paper.

February 20 – International Investment

1. Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment. *The Journal of Politics* 70 (4):1040–1052.
2. Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2013. The domestic politics of financial internationalization in the developing world. *Review of International Political Economy* 20 (4):848–880.
3. Johns, Leslie, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment. *American Political Science Review* 110 (1):31–51.
4. Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2017. The unintended consequences of bilateralism: treaty shopping and international tax policy. *International Organization* 71:349–371.
5. Malesky, Edmund J., and Layna Mosley. 2021. Labor upgrading and export market opportunities: Evidence from Vietnam. *Economics & Politics* 33 (3):483–513.
6. Rec Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization* 45 (4):425–451.
7. Rec Quinn, Dennis P., and Carla Inclán. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3):771–813.
8. Rec Henisz, Witold J. 2000. The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16 (2):334–364.
9. Rec Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1):171–189.
10. Rec Li, Quan. 2006. Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis. *The Journal of Politics* 68 (1):62–74.
11. Rec Antras, Pol, Mihir A. Desai, and C. Fritz Foley. 2009. Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (3):1171–1219.
12. Rec Pandya, Sonal S. 2014. Democratization and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 1970–2000. *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (3):475–488.
13. Pond, Amy. 2018. Worker Influence on Capital Account Policy: Inflow Liberalization and Outflow Restrictions. *International Interactions* 44 (2):244–267.
14. ———. 2018. Financial Liberalization: Stable Autocracies and Constrained Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (1):105–135.

15. *Rec* Wright, Joseph, and Boliang Zhu. 2018. Monopoly Rents and Foreign Direct Investment in Fixed Assets. *International Studies Quarterly* 62:341–356.
16. *Rec* Zhu, Boliang, and Weiyi Shi. 2019. Greasing the Wheels of Commerce? Corruption and Foreign Investment. *Journal of Politics* 81 (4).

February 27 – International Investment Agreements

1. Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization* 60 (4):811–846.
2. Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2010. Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:1–26.
3. Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019. Foreign Financing and the International Sources of Property Rights. *World Politics* 71 (3):503–541.
4. Johns, Leslie, Calvin Thrall, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2020. Judicial economy and moving bars in international investment arbitration. *The Review of International Organizations* 15 (4):923–945.
5. Kerner, Andrew, and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2021. Do Investor-State Disputes (Still) Harm FDI? *British Journal of Political Science* Forthcoming:1–24.
6. *Rec* Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2011. Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 65 (3):401–432.
7. *Rec* Kerner, Andrew, and Jane Lawrence. 2014. What’s the Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation. *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (1):107–121.
8. *Rec* Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2017. What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes? *International Organization* 71:559–583.
9. *Rec* Berge, Tarald Laudal. 2020. Dispute by Design? Legalization, Backlash, and the Drafting of Investment Agreements. *International Studies Quarterly* 64:919–28.
10. *Rec* Dafe, Florence, and Zoe Williams. 2021. Banking on courts: financialization and the rise of third-party funding in investment arbitration. *Review of International Political Economy* 28 (5):1362–1384.
11. *Rec* Moelecke, Carolina, Calvin Thrall, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2023. Global Value Chains as a Constraint on Sovereignty: Evidence from Investor–State Dispute Settlement. *International Studies Quarterly* 67:1–16.
12. *Rec* Allen, Michael O. 2023. Unbundling the State: Legal Development in an Era of Global, Private Governance. *International Organization* 77:754–788.

March 6 – Exchange Rates, Central Banks, and Credibility

1. Clark, William Roberts, and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. *American Political Science Review* 94 (2):323–346.
2. Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2002. Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration. *International Organization* 56 (4):831–860.
3. Bodea, Cristina, and Masaaki Higashijima. 2017. Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending? *British Journal of Political Science* 47 (1):47–70.
4. Manger, Mark S., and Thomas Sattler. 2020. The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances in the post-Bretton Woods Era. *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (3-4):631–664.
5. Quinn, Dennis P., Thomas Sattler, and Stephen Weymouth. 2023. Do Exchange Rates Influence Voting? Evidence from Elections and Survey Experiments in Democracies. *International Organization* 77 (4):789–823.
6. *Rec* Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53 (1):71–97.

7. *Rec* Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4):1003–1027.
8. *Rec* Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. 2003. The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. *The American Political Science Review* 97 (3):407–423.
9. *Rec* Stein, Ernesto H., and Jorge M. Streb. 2004. Elections and the timing of devaluations. *Journal of International Economics* 63:119–145.
10. *Rec* Bodea, Cristina. 2010. The political economy of fixed exchange rate regimes: The experience of post-communist countries. *European Journal of Political Economy* 26 (2):248–264.
11. *Rec* Guisinger, Alexandra, and David A. Singer. 2010. Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility. *International Organization* 64 (2):313–337.
12. *Rec* Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. 2015. International Finance and Central Bank Independence: Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital. *Journal of Politics* 77 (1):268–284.
13. *Rec* Rey, H el ene. 2015. Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence. *NBER Working Paper No. 21162* 1–42.
14. *Rec* Morrison, James Ashley. 2016. Shocking Intellectual Austerity: The Role of Ideas in the Demise of the Gold Standard in Britain. *International Organization* 70 (1):175–207.
15. *Rec* Gulotty, Robert, and Dorothy Kronick. 2022. The Arbitrage Lobby: Theory and Evidence on Dual Exchange Rates. *International Organization* 76 (1):105–125.

March 13 – Spring break

March 20 – Debt, Crisis and the International Monetary Fund

1. Vreeland, James R. 2003. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases. *International Political Science Review* 24 (3):321–343.
2. Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):577–591.
3. Bastiaens, Ida, and Nita Rudra. 2016. Trade liberalization and the challenges of revenue mobilization: can international financial institutions make a difference? *Review of International Political Economy* 23 (2):261–289.
4. Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Layna Mosley, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2021. Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions, and Global Capital Cycles. *British Journal of Political Science* 51 (1):353–373.
5. Dasgupta, Aditya, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. Capital Meets Democracy: The Impact of Franchise Extension on Sovereign Bond Markets. *American Journal of Political Science* 66 (3):630–647.
6. *Rec* Haggard, Stephan, and Jongryn Mo. 2000. The Political Economy of the Korean Financial Crisis. *Review of International Political Economy* 7 (2):197–218.
7. *Rec* Abiad, Abdul, and Ashoka Mody. 2005. Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It? *American Economic Review* 95 (1):66–88.
8. *Rec* Leblang, David, and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises. *International Organization* 60, 245-250.
9. *Rec* Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund. *International Organization* 60 (2):367–399.
10. *Rec* Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:49–77.
11. *Rec* Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox, and Sebastian Saiegh. 2012. Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage. *International Organization* 66:709–738.
12. *Rec not for presentation* Calomiris, Charles W., and Stephen H. Haber. 2014. *Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crisis and Scarce Credit*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

13. *Rec* Grittersová, Jana. 2014. Transfer of reputation: Multinational banks and perceived creditworthiness of transition countries. *Review of International Political Economy* 21 (4):878–912.
14. *Rec* Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stefanie Walter. 2016. The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis. *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (7):811–840.
15. *Rec* Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Layna Mosley, and Rachel Wellhausen. 2022. Coming to Terms: The Politics of Sovereign Bond Denomination. *International Organization* 76 (1):32–69.
16. *Rec* Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. 2016. Hungry for Change: Food Imports, Urban Bias, and the Political Economy of Debt Default in Autocracies. *International Organization* 70 (2):313–346.
17. *Rec* Lipsy, Phillip Y. 2018. Democracy and Financial Crisis. *International Organization* 72 (Fall):937–968.
18. *Rec not for presentation* Eichengreen, Barry, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves, and Kris James Mitchener. 2019. Public Debt through the Ages. *NBER Working Paper* 25494:1–58.
19. *Rec* Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Layna Mosley, and Peter Rosendorff. 2024. Paris Club Restructuring and the Rise of China. *Political Economy of International Organization Working Paper*.

March 27 – Law and Regulation in the Global Economy

1. Mattli, Walter, and Tim Büthe. 2003. Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power? *World Politics* 56 (1):1–42.
2. Beazer, Quintin H., and Daniel J. Blake. 2018. The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment. *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (2):470–485.
3. Perlman, Rebecca L. 2019. For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors. *American Journal of Political Science* Forthcoming:1–16.
4. Wilf, Meredith. 2016. Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence from US Bank Stock Returns. *International Organization* 70 (4):763–796.
5. Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2023. Governments as Borrowers and Regulators. *Review of International Organizations* Forthcoming.
6. Findley, Michael G., Daniel L. Nielson, and J. C. Sharman. 2024. Banking bad? A global field experiment on risk, reward, and regulation. *American Journal of Political Science* Forthcoming:1–15.
7. *Rec* Singer, David Andrew. 2004. Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization. *International Organization* 58:531–565.
8. *Rec* Kerner, Andrew, and Jeffrey Kucik. 2010. The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws. *International Studies Quarterly* 54:657–682.
9. *Rec* Kaczmarek, Sarah C., and Abraham Newman. 2011. The Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation. *International Organization* 65 (4):745–770.
10. *Rec* Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2015. Structuring power: business and authority beyond the nation state. *Business and Politics* 17 (3):527–552.
11. *Rec* Bradford, Anu, Adam S. Chilton, Christopher Megaw, and Nathaniel Sokol. 2019. Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 16 (2):411–443.
12. *Rec not for presentation* Gulotty, Robert. 2020. *Narrowing the Channel: The Politics of Regulatory Protection in International Trade*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
13. *Rec* Allen, Michael O., and Kenneth Scheve. 2022. Sustaining Capitalism and Democracy: Lessons from Global Competition Policy. *International Studies Review* 18:1–22.

April 3 – Development and Foreign Aid

1. Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian. 2011. Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (1):106–118.

2. Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. *American Economic Review* 101 (7):3221–3252.
3. Ahmed, Faizal. 2012. The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival. *American Political Science Review* 106 (1):146–165.
4. Blodgett Bermeo, Sarah. 2017. Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World. *International Organization* 71:735–766.
5. Pratt, Tyler. 2021. Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking. *International Studies Quarterly* 65 (1):95–108.
6. *Rec* Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2007. Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2):251–284.
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April 10 – Immigration

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April 17 – Climate Change

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April 24 – IPE, Sanctions and Conflict

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April 30 – Circulate drafts for peer review by 5 p.m.

May 2 – Peer review due by 5 p.m.

May 5 – Final papers due via Canvas by 5 p.m.

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