My research analyzes political conflicts between politicians, business executives and citizens. I am particularly interested in how and when politicians open markets to foreign goods and investments, and when politicians make credible commitments to stable institutional structures like democratic political institutions and property rights. More broadly, my research interests include the politics of finance and trade; the politics of ownership structure, including market concentration, stock listings, production linkages, joint ventures, and asset mobility; property rights; democratization and representation; formal modeling; and anything political economy. All papers and replication files are available by request.
18. Brutger, Ryan and Pond, Amy. Forthcoming. "Partisan Preferences for Antitrust Policy," Political Science Research and Methods, pdf
We show that Republicans are more concerned about punishing big businesses and Democrats are more concerned about threats to democracy in considering antitrust regulations.
17. Pond, Amy. Forthcoming. "Asset Mobility and Property Rights," International Organization
This paper explores how asset mobility affects not only business influence but also the preferences of business owners. It shows that owners with substantial mobile assets have the least to gain from property rights.
16. Brutger, Ryan and Pond, Amy. 2025. "International Economic Relations and American Support for Antitrust Policy," Business and Politics, Vol 27, Issue 2, 159-179 pdf
We evaluate how pressure from global markets affects public opinion on antitrust policy. We find that respondents are concerned about threats to national competitiveness.
15. Lee, Jonghoon and Pond, Amy. 2025. "Antitrust and Corporate Taxation," Business and Politics, Vol 27, Issue 3, 350-371 pdf
We find that non-democratic countries are more willing to tradeoff antitrust enforcement in exchange for revenues.
Runner up for the 2025 Baron award for best article published in Business and Politics.
14. Betz, Timm and Pond, Amy. "Governments as Borrowers and Regulators," 2025, Review of International Organizations, Vol 20, 189-218, pdf
Democratic governments encourage and force institutional investors and banks to hold government debt, privileging their own debt but falling short of conventional understandings of financial repression.
13. Betz, Timm and Pond, Amy. 2023. "Democratic institutions and regulatory privileges for government debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 79, 1-18, pdf, data, readme
Democratic governments encourage and force institutional investors and banks to hold government debt, privileging their own debt but falling short of conventional understandings of financial repression.
12. Betz, Timm and Pond, Amy. 2022. "Politically Connected Owners," Comparative Political Studies, Vol 54, Issue 6, 561-595, pdf
Because political connections provide substantial benefits to firms, political turnover prompts newly politically connected individuals to take, and disconnected individuals to cede, ownership of firms.
11. Betz, Timm; Pond, Amy; and Yin, Weiwen. 2021. "Investment Agreements and the Fragmentation of Firms across Countries," Review of International Organizations, Vol 16, 755-791, pdf
Firms manipulate their structure of ownership to gain access to investment agreements.
10. Pond, Amy. 2021. "Biased Politicians and Independent Agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol 33, Issue 3, 279-299, pdf
In issue areas where politicians are biased and citizens cannot perfectly observe the quality of agency reforms, citizens may assume that reform serves the politician's interest and punish him for any reform at all. Agency independence then comes more from informational challenges than from institutional design.
9. Carroll, Robert J. and Pond, Amy. 2021. "Costly Signaling in Autocracy," International Interactions, Vol 47, Issue 4, 612-632, pdf
Using a simple signaling model, we show that rulers, who are concerned about perceptions of their strength, are more likely to use shows of force rather then economic transfers to undermine opposition.
8. Zafeiridou, Christina and Pond, Amy. 2020. "The Political Importance of Financial Performance," American Journal of Political Science, Vol 64, Issue 1, 152-168, pdf
Political concern for financial performance limits the extent to which immobile assets can be targeted for taxation.
7. Arel-Bundock, Vincent; Peinhardt, Clint; and Pond, Amy. 2020. "Political Risk Insurance: A New Firm-Level Dataset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 64, Issue 5, 987-1006, pdf
This paper introduces a dataset which includes information on over 5000 political risk insurance contracts issued by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
6. Betz, Timm and Pond, Amy. 2019. "Foreign Financing and the International Sources of Property Rights," World Politics, Vol 71, Issue 3, 503-541, pdf
By forming financial relationships with foreign firms, domestic firms gain indirect coverage from the property rights available to foreign firms under international law.
5. Betz, Timm and Pond, Amy. 2019. "The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy," Journal of Politics, Vol 81, Issue 2, 585-600, pdf
Using data on consumption shares across product categories, this paper reports evidence that consumer interests have little impact on tariffs, even as countries democratize.
4. Pond, Amy. 2018. "The Politics of Redistribution, Property Rights, and Financial Openness," Economics & Politics, Vol 30, Issue 2, 181-210, pdf
In responding to investors, governments rely more on property rights provision (rather than limiting redistribution) in order to attract foreign investment when political institutions are more representative.
3. Pond, Amy. 2018. "Worker Influence on Capital Account Policy: Inflow Liberalization and Outflow Restrictions," International Interactions, Vol 44, Issue 2, 244-267, pdf
When labor groups have political influence, we observe more openness to capital inflows and less openness to capital outflows.
2. Pond, Amy. 2018. "Financial Liberalization: Stable Autocracies and Constrained Democracies," Comparative Political Studies, Vol 51, Issue 1, 105-135, pdf
Autocrats may use liberalization to stimulate the economy and stabilize their rule or to reduce redistribution in anticipation of democratization.
1. Pond, Amy. 2017. "Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 61, Issue 5, 1073-1094, pdf
Sanctions restrict international trade flows, creating rents for import-competing producers, who are use these rents to pressure the government to implement protectionist policies.
Betz, Timm and Pond, Amy. "Production Networks and Preferences for Property Rights"
Firms differ in the extent to which they benefit from property rights. Those with substantial ties to other firms seek rights for themselves and for their partners.
Haffert, Lukas; Pond, Amy; and Rommel, Tobias. "The Electoral Costs of Reforming Political Institutions"
Although voters may be poorly informed about the content of electoral reforms, they do perceive the potential for parties to implement opportunistic electoral reforms and they punish politicians for reforms. Only reforms supported by several parties do not trigger backlash.
Loeffler, Hannah and Pond, Amy. "Political Opposition to Foreign Real Estate Ownership"
As house prices increase in many countries, restrictions on non-resident owners emerge as an attractive political solution.
Pond, Amy. "Market Concentration and Property Rights"
Large firms operating in concentrated markets have little to gain from property rights improvements. Small firms on the other hand cannot capture policy to their own benefit and the best they can do is seek unbiased policies, like property rights.